HORN OF AFRICA'S PROBLEM IS THE LEGACY
OF THE ABYSINIAN EMPIRE STATE
(ETHIOPIA).
By Abdullahi M. Sadi
Abdullahisadi@hotmail.com
Former First President of Somali Region (Ogadenia).
Part 1
Part 2 | Part 3
One who studies Abysinian feudal Empire State (Ethiopia) history will be
compelled to arrive at the coming conclusion:
The Abysinian feudal Empire State was the extension of the rule of the
Abysinian people (Amhara and Tigray rulers). The Abysinian Empire
regimes enslaved the whole Horn of Africa Nations and people, i.e.
Somalis, Oromos, Afars, Eritrean, Sidamo and others. The causes of the
present instability in the Horn of Africa are a combination of the
legacy of Abysinian expansionist rule, its colonial legacy and European
colonial intervention. The result of the colonization has produced
continuos civil and national war, in Ethiopia, which has a history of
despotic and dictatorial regimes. As a matter of fact, Ethiopia has
never enjoyed democratic constitutional governments.
Moreover, all the available indicators, illustrates that Ethiopia is one
of the most backward countries in the world. The basic characteristics
of Ethiopia socio-economics life are political instability, civil war,
poverty, famine, and illiteracy.
Historically, Ethiopia participated and emerged from the partition of
Africa in Berlin in 1884 as a black Christian state which had a royal
lineage, claiming descent from the legendary son of king Solomon and the
queen of Sheba, which not only survived but actually profited from
European partition. Like the European empires in Africa, Ethiopia was a
conquest state. Its core people were the politically dominant
Semitic-speaking Amharas. Socially the Amharas comprised a loose three-
tier hierarchy with military aristocrats and clergy living off the
surplus production of a cereal-growing lay peasantry, which also reared
cattle. Amhara stratification contrasted sharply with the traditional
egalitarianism of the nomadic Cushitic-speaking pastoralists. The Muslim
Somalis, were organized in segmentary lineages, led by assemblies of
elders rather than formally appointed chiefs. The Abysiinian Empire
unlike European empires in Africa or the European-settler states, was
indigenous centralist nationalism.
Abyssinian conquest and expansion reached its furthest extent under the
Emperor Menelik, an astute and forceful participant in the ‘scramble’ of
Africa, who exploited European competition for predominance in the area
to modernize his army and routed the Italian at Adowa in 1896. In a
series of treaties Menelik awarded trading rights to Britain, France and
Italy together with recognition for their various spheres of influence
along the coast, while in exchange they supplied the international
recognition to legitimize his recent conquests. Consequently Eritrea and
three-quarters of the Somali people were brought under European rule,
while the remainders (the Somali Ogadenia) were assigned to Abyssinia
(Ethiopia).
To cement and legitimize its occupation of Somali Ogaden, the Ethiopian
embarked on a large-scale diplomatic offensive to counter Mr. Ernest
Bevin, The British foreign secretary who proposed, the Somali nation
should be put together as a trust territory, and to win the American
support.
In December 1943 Roosevelt received the first Ethiopian minister to the
United State, and in February 1945 on his way home from the Crimean
conference the president met king Haile Seliassie of Ethiopian empire,
appropriately as one of the victims of fascism, won further
international leverage as a founder member of the United Nations.
Shortly after the end of the war it commissioned an American public
relations consultant, J. C. Cairns, who enlisted the help of prominent
personalities, including Mrs. Roosevelt, to ensure popular goodwill was
translated into effective diplomatic support. There was no Somali lobby
to counter the support of African-American organizations and such
celebrities as Paul Robeson for Ethiopia in what they believe to be a
British attempt to bully a small black state with which they personally
identified.
Pre-war geological surveys by the Italians indicated that Oil might be
found in the Ogaden. In 1944 the American-owned Sinclair Oil Company,
backed by the state department, began secret negotiations with the
Ethiopian government for sole prospecting rights. Should oil be found in
commercial quantities such a monopolistic agreement would give the
United States greater power to fix world oil prices? In 1945 when the
news broke that Singlair had succeeded in secretly negotiating such a
deal during wartime in a Britain area of operations there was anger in
London and disquiet elsewhere. An amalgam of sentiment, suspicion and
hardheaded commercial interest worked against the presumed ‘special
relationship’ in the Horn. Here was a fine opportunity for the United
States to demonstrate anti colonial credentials while protecting the
interests of an American oil company. Henceforth the three-way
relationship between Britain, Ethiopia and United States provides an
intricate study in the diplomacy of dependency, with the emperor
attaching himself firmly to the United States just when the British were
being forced to come to terms with American dominance.
This was the situation when Bevin took up the cause of Somali nation by
proposing the reunification of all the Somalilands, including the
Ogaden, as United Nations Trust Territory. In Bevin’s eyes this amounted
to simple justice. He read the treaties of partition, which underwrote
colonial and Ethiopian boundaries, gloosed
by the Somali experts in the British Military administration, and agreed
that the Europeans and Menelik had reached their agreements at the
expense of the Somali people. Indeed, some of the treaties, which were
regarded as giving a legal basis for incorporating the Somali within
alien political structures, seemed to have been willfully
misinterpreted. But Bevin’s proposal to reunite the Somali nation met
some opposition, not just from sections of American opinion, but also
from Molotov in the 1946 Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign
Ministers. Britain generally took the same line in the immediate
post-war discussions between the ‘Big Three’ as it had in the war, ‘that
nineteenth century imperialism was dead in England, which was no longer
an expansionist country’; in this particular case Bevin ‘was merely
trying to right nineteenth century wrong.’
Molotov, intended on forcing recognition for the pro-Soviet Bulgarian
and Romanian governments pounced: England has troops and military bases
in Greece, Denmark, Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia, and elsewhere. The Soviet
Union has no bases beyond its border, and this shows the difference
between expansion and security. He also, mischievously, suggested that
the Soviet Union be granted an African colony, such as Tripolitania;
should none of Italy’s be available then the Belgian Congo would do
nicely. (The location, as he did not need to remind his Anglo-American
audience, of their strategically vital supplies of uranium.) Pierson
Dixon, Bevin’s private secretary thought the Soviet attack on ‘United
Somaliland’ was designed to impress the American: The Russians know the
American phobia about the British Empire’. Bevin decided to cut his
losses and withdraw the Greater Somalia plan, at least for the time
being, much to surprise and chagrin of many of his officials. (There is
an obvious parallel between Bevin’s clash and American support for
Zionism to the neglect of Palestinian rights, which was developing at
the same time) Instead of a greater Somalia under joint trusteeship,
with the threat of Soviet participation, the western allies now proposed
a brief revival of Italian colonialism to be devoted to guiding Italian
Somaliland to independence under United Nations’ mandate.
British officials were reluctant to accept their government’s
abandonment of united Somali nation. Officers in all ranks of the
Military Administration, drawn from the army which had defeated
Mussolini’s forces, still believed they had the right to redraft
boundaries unilaterally and promised the Somali there would be no
returns to Italian rule whatever the safeguards. They established a
close working relationship with the nascent political party, the Somali
Youth League (SYL) which was founded in 1943, which was similarly
committed to Somali nation unity. It was a direct continuation of the
Dervish struggle 0f 1889-1921 which were brutally suppressed by Britain
with the use, for the first time in colonial wars, of aerial
bombardment. As the four powers determined the inhabitant's wishes for
unity, rival factions clashed in bloodies riot in Mogadishu, resulting
in the infamous "Dhgaxtuur confrontation". There was a hidden Italian
agenda behind this and it facilitated an immediate several British
senior officials who had worked closely with nationalist were replaced
and Bevin, goaded by Attlee's wishes not to be saddled with further
'deficit', determined to withdraw as quickly as possible from both the
Ogadenia and Somalia.
The Ogadenia was, therefore, relinquished to Ethiopia. What had been
Italian Somaliland was made into a United Nations trusteeship, much
smaller than that projected by Bevin, under Italian administration, to
last for 10 years. In 1952 the General Assembly decided that Eritrea be
federated with Ethiopia as a locally autonomous state, despite evidence
of considerable opposition from the large Eritrean population. The
highly centralized Ethiopian regime regarded such autonomy as dangerous
and from the outset sought to reduce Eritrea to an ordinary Ethiopian
Province.
Undoubtedly Haile Selassie profited from this four-way play involving
Ethiopia the United States, Britain and Italy. So did the United States.
With Italy originally sidelined, readmitted as a badge of
rehabilitation, the main losers in European colonialism’s end-game at
the horn of Africa were not the British-who, in any case, even if they
did not get all they wanted in this instance cashed in on the
Anglo-American relationship elsewhere, notably in Cyrenaica.
Just as at the start of colonialism at the ‘scramble’, it was the
un-centralized, egalitarian peoples of the periphery, notably the
Somalis, who lost out in Ethiopia’s transactions with the west.
When the United Nations General Assembly eventually disposed of the
Italian colonies in 1949, its president, General Romulo of the
Philippines declared, with unconscious irony, that the decisions taken
constituted a triumph for the principle of self-determination. In the
very process of decolonization, the Empire State of Ethiopia thus
triumphed over the Somali People in Ogadenia.
The Congress of all Somali National that was held in Mogadishu on
February 1, 1948 sent a petition to the United Nations secretary
general.
The petition contained the desire of all Congress members to end
colonial presence in their land and unify the five regions of Somali
territories, that were then under British, Italian, French and
Abyssinian Empire State (Ethiopia).
Unfortunately on the 24 September 1948 Britain acted unilaterally, and
handed over to the Empire State of Ethiopia once again to Somali
Ogadenia, despite the renewed and better opposition of the people who
expressed themselves in riots throughout the country. In many towns
these up rising were ruthlessly put down, the Ethiopian Soldiers shoots
25 persons and led to a waning of SYL activities in the occupied Somali
Ogadenia. However, Britain’s generosity to Ethiopia continued and in
1954-55 Britain completed hand over the remaining portion of the Somali
Ogadenia. This was the final act of British government betrayal, and its
not at all surprising that today Somalis, without rancor, blame Britain
for much of their troubles in that their land was illegally and secretly
handed over to their traditional enemy. The cost in human misery is
incalculable.
In 1960 the former Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland became
independence. These two territories were united and became the Somali
Republic.
Overnight a minor Abyssinian chief-tainship was transformed in a Feudal
Colonial Empire State, by not only establishing its politico-economic
structure and building for it a strong military equipped with modern
weapons. The Ethiopian State elite, lacking the sophistication and
economic and technical advancement of former colonizers could not
meliorate or mask its exploitation and colonial presence nor did it have
the necessary power to establish adequate control. Instead of posing as
a national state advancing the interests of its subjects and providing
some measure of services and low and order it confined itself to armed
presence and extreme suppressive measures. The Somali Ogadenians nursing
the wounds of treachery done to them were further antagonized by the
savage and unwarranted treatment they received from the occupation army.
This inevitable led to a popular uprising and formation of an organized
resistance. The Somali Ogadenia People had no choice but continue the
liberation struggle with its present specific identity: the Somali
Ogadenia struggle for self-determination.
The prominent leaders of the Somali Ogadenia led by Dr. Ibrahim Hashe
began thinking seriously and formed in 1950s, underground movement that
would lead organize political consciousness of the people. The movement
constituted itself into a party Nasrullahi. Because of the pressure of
Ethiopia repression and surveillance the movement moved its headquarters
to the capital of Somalia in 1960.
After new political restrictions were introduced by Abyssinian empire
state government that made the Ogadenia be governed by martial law after
the 1948 events. Public gathering of more than five persons were banned
at one place.
Hence, Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF), under the leadership of Makhtal
Dahir had emerged from such long traditional of liberation movements in
1963, as response to the new situation. It started its armed struggle on
16th, June 1963 when the first congress was held at Hodayo, inside
Ogadenia. The Ogaden Liberation Front began its resistance in the remote
areas of Ogadenia and appealed to the local people to intensify the
resistance and widen its scope. This enabled the OLF to wage offensive
operations as well as ambushes and skirmishes with impressive results.
The reaction of the stunned Ethiopians was to desert the more remote
areas of the country and leave them to the unchallenged control of the
OLF. The Ogaden Liberation Front soon succeeded in forcing the
Ethiopians to surrender or evacuate villages and small towns. Thus,
leaving the major part of the rural areas under the control of the OLF.
By 1964 the Ogaden Liberation Front was poised to attack the major towns
of the Somali Ogadenia. The Ethiopian Government then decided to
escalate the war by invading the young Republic of Somalia in February
1964, claiming that the Somali Republic was attacking the Ethiopian
State. It is worth mentioning, in 1959 Haile Selassie's cabinet
formulated Ethiopia's policy towards the Ogaden. The policy recommended
a series of measures ranging from propaganda to diplomacy, to brutal
oppression all aimed at transforming the Ogadenia from Its colonial
status to a border dispute with Somalia. Ethiopia, fearing the
consequences of popular armed struggle and understanding the political
ramifications immediately blamed Somalia on expansionism and turned the
issue into border dispute. Through the intervention of supper-power and
regional organizations, both Somalia and Ethiopia were forced to accept
a negotiated settlement in 1965. The Ogadenia issue was ignored and the
new movement was retarded. ....continues into Part 2
READ PART 2
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Opinion expressed here are those of the author [signed] and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of SomaliTalk